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The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of
the Antidiscrimination Standard in
Employment
Bernard D. Meltzert
In United Steelworkers v. Weber," the Supreme Court, divid-
ing five to two, ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642
permits employers under certain circumstances to grant black
workers employment preferences. This division within the Court is
a reminder that Weber is a case of great significance. In giving a
new answer to the question of how "equality" was defined by Con-
gress in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court's decision cuts deeply
into the values underlying that legislation. It also underscores old
questions as to the institutional role and competency of the
Court-how its perceptions and values should be meshed with
those reflected in the language and history of a statute. Although
Weber's reach and implications are, as we shall see, obscure, its
potential radiations are far reaching, extending to virtually all em-
t Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. For their reading
of a prior draft and their helpful comments, I am grateful to Frank Easterbrook, Julius
Getman, Philip B. Kurland, Douglas Laycock, Paul Meier, and Daniel J. Meltzer. I wish also
to thank Paul Beach and Terence Molinari, University of Chicago Law School class of 1980,
for their helpful research. My shorter assessment of Weber appeared in REGULATION, Sept.-
Oct. 1979, at 34.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
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ployment decisions. In addition, Weber has symbolic significance
as a statement of the Court's, and thus the country's, concern for
the economic welfare of blacks as a group. The Court's approach,
however, may aggravate the racial polarization of our society and
may obstruct the achievement of the ends that, as Justice Rehn-
quist implied in dissent,$ lay behind the Court's interpretation of
the statute.
Weber thus invites discussion of the varied opinions that it
evoked and of the reach and implications of the Court's approach.
Before turning to those matters, a reference to the conflicting val-
ues and discordant regulation that led to the Weber case is
appropriate.
I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CONFLICTING THEMES AND
DISCORDANT COMMANDS
The early aim of the civil rights struggle was color blindness.
Government and then private employers were to remove race as an
impediment to full equality of opportunity.4 That goal commanded
broad support, for it was compatible with the classic values and
aspirations of American society-protection of individual merit or
productivity, rather than ancestry, as the determinant of individ-
ual progress.5
Later, however, some proponents of civil rights proposed a
much more controversial approach, under which color was to be a
factor in rationing scarce opportunitiess-an approach unpalatable
to some staunch proponents of color-blind, equal opportunity.7
This new color-conscious standard, for some of its adherents, was
to be only, or predominantly, a tool of proof, designed to ensure
that equality of opportunity was not denied by closet discrimina-
3 443 U.S. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4 See note 10, infra. See generally J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73 (1971).
1 See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976); Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time
Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 41 U. CHr. L. REV. 742, 743-48 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fiss, The Fate of an Idea
Whose Time Has Come]; Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235,
240-44 (1971); Handlin, The Goals of Integration, 95 DAEDALUS 268, 270 (1966).
6 E.g., Turner & Young, Who Has the Revolution or Thoughts on the Second Recon-
struction, 94 DAEDALUS 1148 (1965). See the more cautious support of color consciousness in
Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come, supra note 5, at 764-70. See generally
Ha.ndlin, The Quest for Equality, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 35, 46-50.
See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 331-34 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 132-33 (1975).
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tion.8 For others, color consciousness .was justified by additional
and independent considerations. Since stigma and deprivation had
been group based and had present consequences, current compen-
satory action should, it was argued, also be a function of group
membership." Such group relief would also fit into a general redis-
tributive strategy, however crude, since blacks as a group10 were
relatively poor or "disadvantaged." Finally, rationing by color
would, some thought, serve to promote social peace by showing
that discrimination was receding and by giving blacks a bigger
share of the national pie.1
It seems clear that in Title VII Congress enacted a color-blind
standard that, in general, was to protect whites as well as blacks
against discrimination in employment. Nevertheless, it was also
clear that color-blind standards that screen out blacks might, if
mechanically applied under Title VII, become proxies for racial
discrimination.12 Such ostensibly color-free standards that were ex-
8 This purpose was reflected in the hospitality ultimately extended by the Supreme
Court to statistical proof in Title VII cases. E.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
443 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). See also EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n,
532 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1976); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047, 1055 (5th Cir. 1969) (imposing color-conscious hiring remedies, in part be-
cause of judicial doubts that offending employers or unions would obey the law absent such
compulsion).
' See, e.g., Brest, supra note 5, at 41-42, 50-52; Nickel, Discrimination and Morally
Relevant Characteristics, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 288 (B. Gross ed. 1977); Nickel, Pref-
erential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 534, 537-39 (1975); Schwartzbaum, In Search of a Constitutional Right to Federal
Compensation for the Black and Poor, 15 How. L.J. 590 (1969). For a systematic examina-
tion of the general issues involved, see B. BraKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS
(1973); A. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (1979).
10 Although I have rferred to the protection of "blacks," the antidiscrimination stan-
dard enacted into Title VII was much broader, reflecting the fact that members of other
groups in the United States had been the victims of discrimination-albeit of varying inten-
sity and duration. Accordingly, Title VII sought to protect not only blacks but members of
all races, various religious groups, and women. See notes 79-81 infra. Consequently, the Act
created obstacles to special programs of preferences for blacks and other "protected
groups." In the ensuing discussion, the context will make it clear when "blacks" is used in
its narrowest sense and when it is used as a proxy for members of all groups protected by
Title VII.
" Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400-02 (1978) (opinion of Mar-
shall, J.); Jones, On the Justifiability of Reverse Discrimination, in REVERSE DIscRIMINA-
TION, supra note 9, at 348, 348-49; Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A
Jurisprudential Approach, supra note 9, at 534, 539-42.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 129-30 (8th
Cir. 1969) (requirement of work experience with particular employers who had not previ-
ously hired blacks). See also Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969) (nepotistic requirements in predominantly white work
force).
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clusionary in effect and that lacked a business justification were in
fact struck down.13 It seemed a short step from that position to one
that permitted a "prima facie" case, 14 or, indeed, a violation of Ti-
tle VII, to be established by recourse to statistics showing a racial
imbalance in a work force. As a result, judicial interpretations of
the statute, coupled with related executive policies, reveal a contin-
uing tension between demands for equality of opportunity and de-
mands for equality of result. These developments necessarily put
pressure on employers to avoid the risk of incurring Title VII lia-
bility by adopting race-conscious employment systems 1 --a prac-
tice that led to the Weber litigation.
A. Judicial Ambivalence
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,16 the Supreme Court, in its first
interpretation of Title VII, gave important support to the use of
evidence of statistical imbalance; it emphasized the legal signifi-
cance of employment criteria that had a disparate racial impact,
even though those criteria were facially neutral and had some
functional justification. For our immediate purposes, three aspects
of Griggs are worth noting. First, without defining "discrimina-
tion," the Court made it clear that an employer's good faith in us-
ing a particular selection process-such as standardized, profes-
sionally developed tests-would not necessarily exclude a finding
of "discrimination" if the result was disqualification of "a mark-
edly disproportionate number of Negroes.117 The Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also, as the Court put it,
practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
13 See cases cited note 12 supra.
14 In pattern-and-practice suits, the Supreme Court has ruled that work-force statistics
could establish a prima facie case. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 307-08 (1977) ("gross statistical disparities"); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40, 339 n.20 (1977). In neither Hazelwood nor Teamsters,
however, did the government rely solely on statistics.
15 See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
This crude approach is called into question by Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 305 (Supp. 1979). See also New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
1 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11 Id. at 429.
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which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
.. .Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.18
Second, the Court concluded that Congress had "placed on the
employer the burden of showing that any given requirement" that
a disproportionately large number of blacks could not meet had "a
manifest relationship to the employment in question." 19 With re-
spect to standardized tests, the Court deferred to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's stringent guidelines regarding
validation.20 Thus, the Court not only imposed a heavy burden of
persuasion on employers using tests with racially disparate results,
it also raised a serious question as to whether such tests would ever
withstand legal scrutiny.2 1 These exacting prerequisites for using
"objective criteria," together with the use of statistics showing ra-
cial imbalance to establish a prima facie case, generated additional
"legal" pressure on employers to adopt race-conscious hiring
systems.22
Finally, Griggs was noteworthy because the Court failed to ac-
knowledge that its approach to testing implicitly rejected, or at
least collided with, the principle of color blindness. On the con-
trary, the Court proclaimed the color-free theme of Title VII:
[T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or be-
cause he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely
Id. at 431-32 (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 433-34.
2 See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d
387, 393-97 (2d Cir. 1973). Some employers have succeeded, however, in validating their
selection procedures by showing that their tests had "content validity"-that is, they mea-
sured the ability to perform tasks that the job entailed. E.g., Coopersmith v. Roudebush,
517 F.2d 818, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (legal-writing test); Smith v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 397 F.
Supp. 580, 583-84 (N.D. Ala. 1975) ("General Clerical Test"). But see United States v. New
York, 829 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 47, 69 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1979) (despite employer's
expenditure of $1,250,000, court invalidated a test for state troopers, finding disparate im-
pact, and disapproved a content-validation strategy for tests seeking to measure "intangible
or unobservable" qualities).
22 See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1109, 1130 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
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and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidi-
ously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermis-
sible classification.23
And later, the Court reaffirmed that theme:
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be pre-
ferred over the better qualified simply because of minority or-
igins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Con-
gress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so
that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.
What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract.24
Thus the Court in Griggs failed to address the technical diffi-
culties, practical importance, or internal contradictions of its ap-
proach. Interpreting a statute drafted in terms of protecting indi-
viduals, the Court found "discrimination" because of a differential
outcome for groups, notwithstanding statutory provisions designed
both to protect good faith use of professionally developed tests25
and to foreclose findings of violations based solely on statistical
23 401 U.S. at 430-31.
24 Id. at 436. This statement might be read as invalidating any test on the ground that
it is not job related, whether or not it has a racially disparate impact and without regard to
the race of the complainant. But that approach, which would convert Title VII into a per-
sonnel code, has not, to my knowledge, been adopted. Similarly, when a test with an adverse
impact on blacks is invalidated, it does not appear that a white who did poorly on the test is
entitled to relief under Title VII. Cf. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
583 n.23 (1979) (when a prerequisite for employment is invalidated under Title VII because
of its adverse impact on blacks, a white applicant, although disqualified by that require-
ment, presumably lacks standing to challenge it).
25 Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations,
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.
The legislative history and the ambiguities of this section are considered in Developments,
supra note 22, at 1123-26.
[47:423
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imbalance."6 The employer's offense was, as noted above, not made
dependent on proof of improper motive or intent. Indeed, in
Griggs the Court, acknowledging the employer's good faith,2 7 at-
tributed the disparate racial impact of the tests to societal discrim-
ination that had led to inferior education for blacks. 2 The Court
thus required an employer, when hiring, to avoid disparate out-
comes associated with societal discrimination unless he could show
a "business justification" for accepting such outcomes.
The Court did not, however, spell out when such a justification
would exist. Although lower courts responded with a variety of ap-
proaches,29 they tended to give narrow scope to that defense s0 and,
correspondingly, to subordinate considerations of cost and effi-
ciency to the achievement of ethnic proportionality.3 1 Furthermore,
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,-2 the Court endorsed EEOC
guidelines that required differential validation of employment cri-
teria (that is, a demonstration that such criteria were job-related)
26 Section 7030) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (1976) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject
to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percent-
age of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any em-
ployer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor or-
ganization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or
admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in compari-
son with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.
27 401 U.S. at 432.
29 Id. at 430.
29 See Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-
Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 99-102 (1974).
30 See Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability
Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 911, 912, 918-20 (1979).
31 See id. at 918-20. This emphasis is contrary to that in the pertinent 1964 legislative
history. See Note, supra note 29, at 104 n.32. It is also in tension with the theme that
Weber was to emphasize-the aim of key Republican supporters of Title VII to curtail regu-
lation. See text and note at note 91 infra. Courts expanded federal regulation when they
weighed efficiency against the racial imbalances resulting from the application of facially
neutral selection criteria that had some rational connection with job performance.
It should be observed, however, that Congress, in considering the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, indicated that it approved of the decision in Griggs. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 21-22 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137,
2144, 2156-57; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 n.1, 14 (1971). Nevertheless, the 1972
history also reflects continued opposition to quotas. See note 68 infra.
-2 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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for members of minority and nonminority groups, respectively,
wherever such validation was technically feasible. Those guide-
lines, moreover, imposed on employers the burden of showing that
in a given case validation was not feasible." This burden was ex-
traordinary not only because it involved proof of a negative but
also because the notion of differential validity had been questioned
by technical experts.3 Such considerations presumably inspired
Justice Blackmun's caveat in Albemarle:
[P]re-employment testing, so long as it is fairly related to the
job skills or work characteristics desired, possesses the poten-
tial of being an effective weapon in protecting equal employ-
ment opportunity because it has a unique capacity to measure
all applicants objectively on a standardized basis. I fear that a
too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the
employer little choice, save an impossibly expensive and com-
plex validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota sys-
tem of employment selection. This, of course, is far from the
intent of Title VII35
Nevertheless, four years later in Weber the Justice was to join in
upholding the very selection system that he had decried in
Albemarle.
B. Color-Conscious Remedies
Soon after Albemarle, the Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co.,36 speaking through Justice Marshall, in-
dicated that a subjective quota system would violate both Title VII
and section 1981 of Title 42.37 To be sure, that case dealt with an
33 Id. at 435.
3, See id. at 452 n.3 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); American
Psychological Ass'n Task Force on Employment Testing of Minority Groups, Job Testing
and the Disadvantaged, 24 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 637, 641-42 (1969), cited in United States v.
Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 914 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973).
35 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Despite the risks highlighted by Justice
Blackmun, statistical evidence has a proper and important role to play under Title VII, as
the Court observed in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339
(1977). But, as the Court also observed, careful and informed scrutiny is necessary in order
to prevent "statistics" from degenerating into a sloppy substitute for reliable proof of dis-
crimination. Id. at 340. A full treatment of the use and abuse of statistical proof in this
context and the fitness of courts to handle it is beyond the scope of this article.
36 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
37 Id. at 280, 286-87. The Court was unanimous on the Title VII ruling, but Justices
White and Rehnquist dissented from the ruling on section 1981. Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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issue quite different from that of the propriety of a quota system,
namely, an allegation that two white employees had been fired for
misappropriation while an equally guilty black had been retained.
The Court, however, reaffirmed the position announced in Griggs
that Title VII prohibited "[d]iscriminatory preference for any [ra-
cial] group, minority or majority.""5 The Court also noted that this
broad antidiscrimination principle has been espoused by the
EEOC and was in accord with the uncontradicted legislative his-
tory of Title VII. s9 The Court, however, carefully observed: "we do
not consider here the permissibility of [an affirmative action pro-
gram] whether judicially required or otherwise prompted. 40
The Court's reservation implied that some judicial remedies
for violations of Title VII, among other forms of "affirmative ac-
tion, '41 might collide with the sweeping race-free standard previ-
ously proclaimed by the Court. In this connection, two kinds of
judicial remedies should be distinguished. The first, which is whol-
ly compatible with a race-free standard, attempts to give an identi-
fiable victim of discrimination make-whole relief with respect to
lost pay and competitive seniority status.42 Such restorative justice
may, of course, encroach on the interests of other employ-
ees4s-white or black-but that consequence does not flow from
racial considerations as such; make-whole relief affects incumbents,
as well as victims, without regard to their race.
The second kind of remedy is of a wholly different character;
it requires the offending employer to hire or promote44 a fixed per-
" Id. at 279 (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
31 Id. at 279-80. The employer understandably had conceded that "'across-the-board
discrimination in favor of minorities could never be condoned consistent with Title VII'"
but had sought to distinguish "'such discrimination... in isolated cases which cannot rea-
sonably be said to burden whites as a class unduly."' Id. at 280 n.8 (quoting Brief for Re-
spondent Santa Fe at 20).
40 Id.
41 See note 58 infra.
42 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
43 Concern about such encroachment led Justice Powell (with whom Justice Rehnquist
joined) to dissent in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976), in protest of
what he deemed the Court's virtually automatic requirement of retroactive competitive se-
niority relief to victims of post-Act discrimination and the corresponding disregard of the
interests of innocent employees whose relative seniority would thereby be reduced. Chief
Justice Burger generally agreed with that dissent but went even further, questioning "com-
petitive-type seniority relief at the expense of wholly innocent employees" and urging in-
stead an award of "front pay" for the victim of discrimination. Id. at 780-81 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'4 The Second Circuit has developed a questionable distinction between quotas in hir-
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centage of blacks in a given period of time.45 Such a remedy bene-
fits individuals without regard to whether they themselves have
been the victims of unlawful discrimination. Such color-conscious
relief, although it goes beyond the needs of restorative justice for
individual victims of statutory violations, has been supported by a
cluster of considerations. First, since the actual victims were in-
jured because of their membership in a group, a group-oriented
remedy appears proper.'6 Second, a group remedy sometimes
seems necessary to deal with recalcitrant recidivists 47 and to avoid
difficulties of proof inherent in determining compliance with a gen-
eral injunctive order against discrimination, 8 or to show histori-
cally victimized groups that old patterns of discrimination have en-
ded.49 Finally, this judicial approach underscores the importance of
ing (permissible) and quotas in promotions (impermissible). See generally Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
45 For a survey of the rationales for judicially imposed remedial quotas, see Greenawalt,
The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CALn'. L. REv. 87, 95-98 (1979).
"' See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027 (1st Cir.
1974) (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976)), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 911 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (Title VII);
Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976)
and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) ("The need to remedy past injuries to the black community
takes precedence over the hopes of [white applicants]").
47 See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 437 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977); EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821,
826-27 (2d Cir. 1976); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047, 1055 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 619-21 (5th Cir. 1974)
(need for quotas in suits brought under the fourteenth amendment). In other cases, courts
have refused to require employment of specified percentages of minorities until the em-
ployer again indicates a refusal to comply with the law. See, e.g., Wade v. Mississippi Coop.
Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126, 146 (N.D. Miss. 1974), vacated, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.
1976); Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 360 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
48 Nevertheless, in proceedings for criminal contempt, the qualified right to a jury trial
and the heavier burden of persuasion (proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by clear
and convincing evidence) might complicate enforcement where standards for compliance are
not clear.
4' See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 895 (1974). Cf. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 328-31 (8th Cir. 1971) (rehearing
en bane) (suit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972).
Perhaps the justification most frequently urged by courts for "remedial" quotas is the
need to eliminate the "present effects" of past discrimination. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 628-30 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d
634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). Courts do not specify what effects they seek to eliminate,
but the principal "effects" appear to be statistical imbalances in work forces that are
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the statutory policy of protecting blacks and reinforces the deter-
rent effect of granting back pay liability to identifiable victims of
discrimination. Such considerations lay behind the virtually unani-
mous view of the lower federal courts that Title VII authorized
them to order violators to adopt group remedial preferenceS--a
view that the Supreme Court has not yet considered.51
This view, however, undercuts the principle of color blindness
and thus involves serious questions of statutory construction 52 and
equitable treatment of white candidates for future jobs. Such can-
didates, who had not directly benefited from a particular em-
ployer's discrimination against blacks, would, by virtue of remedial
quotas, be handicapped in job competition with blacks who had
not been directly injured by the employer's violations. Further-
more, this absence of an individuated connection between remedy,
on the one hand, and benefit and injury, on the other,53 makes it
ascribed to societal discrimination and that would continue even after discrimination ended.
Even when such imbalances are evidence of past discrimination by the employer involved,
quota hiring for the future will only fortuitously reach the actual victims of such discrimina-
tion. In fact, as Weber illustrates, the beneficiaries could be wholly distinct from those pre-
viously discriminated against. See text and notes at notes 137-146 infra.
60 For a vigorous exposition of the contrary view, see Judge Hays's dissent in Rios v.
Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634 (2d Cir. 1974). Accord, Brief for Petitioner United
Steelworkers of America at 80-82, 82 n.167, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979). See text and notes at notes 137-153 infra.
:I See text and notes at notes 99-101 infra.
'2 Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), forbids courts to grant
affirmative relief to individuals who were not discriminated against by a particular em-
ployer. This limitation (on judicial power) was repeatedly discussed in the 1964 debates.
E.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6001 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("The only thing that the
court would do would be to ask the defendant to cease and desist, to tell him to stop this
practice, if it can be proved that the practice has been unlawful"); id. at 6549 (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6563 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 6566 (interpretive memoran-
dum by Republicans on House Judiciary Committee).
The Congress in 1972 amended section 706(g) so as to empower a court to grant "any
.. . equitable relief. . . the court deems appropriate." Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1976)). Nevertheless, the legislative history indicates that the increased discretion granted
to courts was not designed to eliminate preexisting restrictions on remedial quotas. Indeed,
the House Conferees insisted on the retention of the 1964 restrictions. See H.R. REP. No.
899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2179, 2183.
53 There was a similar lack of connection between individual victims and the individual
beneficiaries of remedies in the school desegregation cases. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). But in those cases, courts possessed broad
authority to remedy violations of the Constitution and were free from the difficulties posed
by the language and history of Title VII. For other differences in the two situations, see
Greenawalt, supra note 45, at 94-95. For a study of the interplay of the Court's recent
school desegregation cases and Weber, see Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousness to the
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difficult to distinguish such judicially imposed remedial group quo-
tas from similar measures directed at societal discrimina-
tion-measures which Congress prohibited its enforcement agen-
cies from employing.5 4  In addition, such remedial group
preferences are not easily distinguishable from the racial prefer-
ences condemned by the Court in Griggs and Santa Fe.55
For our immediate purposes, there is no need to pursue these
remedial questions. It is enough to note that judicial resort to re-
medial group preferences presumably stimulated employers, on
their own initiative, to adopt similar measures in order to redress
racial imbalances among their employees, thereby reducing the risk
that possibly more draconian remedies would be judicially
imposed.
C. Executive Ambivalence: Executive Order 11,246
Similar pressures for preferential hiring arose under Executive
Order 11,24656 and related regulations, which apply to government
contractors. The Order, issued by President Johnson in 1965,51 re-
quired government contracts to include an "affirmative action
clause '" 5 8 in addition to a nondiscrimination clause. In 1967, Execu-
Constitution: Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
" See Note, supra note 29, at 106 & n.41.
5 In both situations preferences are being granted not to make whole an identifiable
victim but to alleviate societal discrimination, or to improve an employer's racial statistics.
The common feature is the allocation of jobs on the basis of race. To be sure, judicial action
seems less ad hoc. Furthermore, courts would presumably be more sensitive than firms to
the equities of others affected by their measures. But in an adversary system, and especially
when consent decrees are involved or when the defendants welcome the shield of a court
order, judicial concern for the diffused interests of members of the general public could be
quite perfunctory.
3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976).
57 For a discussion of predecessor orders, see K. McGuINEss, PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
IN EMPLOYMENT 11-18 (1977); Nash, Affirmative Action under Executive Order 11,246, 46
N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 225 n.2 (1971).
51 The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed,
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed,
color, or national origin.
Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). "Affirmative action" includes a broad range of mea-
sures, such as (1) efforts to diversify applicant pools ("affirmative recruitment"); (2) efforts
to neutralize bigotry in hiring and promotion; and (3) more or less explicit quotas. Each of
these measures may be essentially "voluntary" or may result from pressures from a variety
of sources, including private groups, government procurement officers, potential litigants
under Title VII, conciliation agreements, consent decrees, and direct judicial orders.
Initially, "affirmative action" was viewed essentially as consisting of both "affirmative
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tive Order 11,37519 added sex to the characteristics that were not
to be used as a basis for employment discrimination.
Executive Order 11,246 did not, however, define "affirmative
action," and contradictions in interpretation soon arose. Thus,
while nondiscrimination was the formal standard, affirmative ac-
tion did not "necessarily" include preferential treatment-but it
did require that in some way the proper "results" be achieved.60
In 1970, new regulations reiterated the emphasis on results,
stating:
An affirmative action program is a set of specific and result-
oriented procedures to which a contractor commits itself to
apply every good faith effort. The objective of those proce-
dures plus such efforts is equal employment opportunity. Pro-
cedures without effort to make them work are meaningless;
and effort, undirected by specific and meaningful procedures,
is inadequate."'
Equality of opportunity, insofar as it meant decisions based on
competence, was to be superseded by or measured by equality of
outcome. An employer's compliance as a practical matter was to be
ascertained by comparing the representation of minorities in his
work force with their representation in some population or labor
market.2 The agencies responsible for compliance pressed contrac-
recruitment" and efforts to remove prejudice from employment decisions, and did not en-
compass discrimination in hiring or promotion. See Allen-Bradley Co., OFCC No. 101-68
(Dec. 17, 1968) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review), plan accepted by the
Secretary of Labor, [1975] EMPL. PRAC. (CCH) T 1634 (Aug. 8, 1969). Although affirmative
recruitment might, under some circumstances, generate problems under Title VII, such re-
cruitment, as well as antidiscrimination training, is in general wholly consonant with the
language and purposes of Title VII.
:9 3 C.F.R. § 684 (1966-1970 Compilation).
0 See, e.g., Statement of Edward C. Sylvester, Jr., Director of OFCC (Jan. 1967),
quoted in R. NATHAN, JOBS AND CIvIL RIGHTS 93 (1969):
I would say that in a general way, affirmative action is anything that you have to do to
get results. But this does not necessarily include preferential treatment. The key word
here is "results." ...
Affirmative action is really designed to get employers to apply the same kind of
imagination and ingenuity that they apply to any other phase of their operation.
61 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1979). This rule was promulgated on Feb. 5, 1970, in 35 Fed.
Reg. 2586, 2587 (1970).
"I Cases arising under Title VII were to refine the population(s) appropriate for deter-
mining whether an employer's work force exhibited the right proportions. See Furnco Con-
str. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 571-72 (1978) (disparate treatment; qualified area work
force); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (disparate treat-
ment; qualified workers in relevant labor market); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430 (1971) (disparate impact; pool of applicants). See also Hallock, The Numbers
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tors for goals and timetables or "commitments" to increase minor-
ity employment, even though there had been no showing of past or
present discrimination by the contractors." Despite the pressure
for racially oriented decisions exerted by these ill-defined extra-
statutory requirements, the regulations contained the usual contra-
puntal disclaimer: The use of goals and timetables "is not intended
. ..to discriminate against any applicant or employee because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.""4 Despite this dis-
claimer, a former Under Secretary of Labor later conceded that
"goals" were ill-disguised quotas.6 5
D. The 1972 Amendments to Title VII
In amending Title VII in 1972, the Senate rejected a proposed
amendment that Was aimed at preventing official pressure for hir-
ing quotas: it would have subjected Executive Order 11,246 to the
limitation embodied in section 703(j) of Title VII.66 That provision
declared that the Act should not be interpreted to require prefer-
ential treatment for certain protected groups because of their un-
derrepresentation in an employer's work force. 7 There is no need
here to speculate on the meaning of the Senate's rejection of this
amendment. Whatever purpose is imputed to the Senate, the ac-
tion of one house with respect to the proposed amendment could
not repeal any consensus against compulsory quotas that was re-
flected in the passage of the 1964 Act. Furthermore, other aspects
Came-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 VILL. L. REv. 5, 15-
34 (1977).
" According to an Under Secretary of Labor, such pressure on "not guilty" contractors
was justified on the ground that "they are required under the Executive Order to go beyond,
to provide affirmative action." Hearings on S. 2515, S. 2617 & H.R. 1746 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 88
(1971) (statement of Laurence H. Silberman), quoted in K. McGuiNEss, supra note 57, at
31.
, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.30 (1979).
65 See Silberman, The Road to Racial Quotas, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1977, at 14, col. 4.
6 See note 26 supra.
67 See 118 CONG. REc. 4917 (1972).
Previously, both houses had defeated efforts to merge the OFCC into the EEOC. Al-
though such proposals had been coupled with bans on hiring quotas, see Comment, The
Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CH. L. REv. 723,
754 (1972), the defeat of such proposals could be viewed both as an oblique approval of the
Philadelphia Plan, see Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), and as a refusal to impose an absolute prohibition against the
use of goals or quotas as tools of an antidiscrimination program. Nevertheless, ambiguity
resulted from the failure to consider such goals separately rather than as part of a program
that had included dismantling of the executive program. See Comment, supra.
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of the 1972 legislative action make it clear that Congress did not
then recede from, but rather reiterated, its opposition to compul-
sory quotas.6 8 Nevertheless, Congress did not specifically foreclose
the use of all color-conscious standards or remedies by courts, nor
did it seek to block the continued judicial development of "dis-
crimination" beyond the idea of disparate or unequal treatment of
individuals.6 9 The congressional action in 1972 thus did not pro-
vide a clear basis for resolving the developing contradictions and
enigmas in the area of employment discrimination.
Similarly, judicial developments after 1972, but before Weber,
were not especially helpful. Indeed, Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, ° which sorely divided the Court, appeared to
highlight the risk faced by employers that Title VII might be read
as banning explicit racial preferences-at least in the absence of
official findings of unlawful conduct by the employer involved.71
II. THE Weber CASE
The discordant elements of Title VII and Executive Order
11,246 led to the Weber litigation. They.prompted Kaiser and the
Steelworkers to adopt a racially preferential training program, in
the hope of avoiding Title VII litigation by blacks as well as addi-
tional pressure from federal contract-compliance officials. At the
same time, the statute and regulations gave Brian Weber grounds
for challenging that program as it was applied to Kaiser's plant at
Gramercy, Louisiana.
68 Such opposition appeared to be an important factor in the congressional refusal in
1972 to grant cease-and-desist authority to the EEOC. Note, supra note 29, at 106 & n.41.
The 1972 debates also reflected concern over quotas that were not directly imposed by the
EEOC but were adopted in order to avoid possible harassment by that agency. The 1964
proposal to empower the EEOC to issue orders was not reported out of the House Judiciary
Committee; it was urged that such authority would retard voluntary conciliation and that
the district courts would give employers fairer treatment. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 435-37 (1966).
69 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 391-93 (1977)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, the 1972 legislative
history reflected a heightened awareness of the need to deal with so-called systemic discrim-
ination. Cf. 118 CONG. REc. 4942 (1972) (analysis of S. 2515 read into the record by Sen.
Williams). Congress not only expressly approved the result in Griggs, see note 31 supra, but
also generally endorsed judicial interpretations of the 1964 Act. 118 CONG. REc. 7166-69
(1972) (Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972). See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 391-93.
70 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See generally Symposium: Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 1-189 (1979).
"' See 438 U.S. at 301-02 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Kaiser opened its Gramercy plant in 1958. By the 1970s,
blacks constituted approximately 39% of the labor force in the
Gramercy area, but less than 15% of Kaiser's work force and less
than 2% of its craft workers. Kaiser had hired only craftsmen
(carpenters, electricians, machinists, and so on) with five years
prior industrial experience-experience rarely possessed by blacks,
who had previously been excluded from craft unions. As a result,
Kaiser's efforts to recruit trained black craftsmen-although ap-
parently bona fide-had been largely ineffective.
In 1974, the collective agreement between Kaiser and the
Steelworkers addressed that recruitment problem; it provided for a
new in-plant craft training program at Gramercy (as well as at
Kaiser's other aluminum and container plants), to which at least
one black was to be admitted for every white until the percentage
of black craft workers equalled the percentage of blacks in the
Gramercy work force, or 39% . Black and white applicants were to
be chosen on the basis of relative seniority within their racial
group.73
In 1974, Brian Weber, a white employee at Gramercy, was
turned down for three skilled training programs even though he
had more seniority than two successful black candidates. He there-
upon brought a class action, challenging the 50% minority admis-
sion quota as a violation of Title VII. The federal district court
upheld his claim and enjoined the use of race as a criterion for
admission to the program.74 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, with Judge Wisdom dissenting, affirmed.7 5 That court em-
7 This program referred to "minority" rather than "black" employees and used "mi-
nority" as defined in the reporting requirements of the EEOC, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (E.D. La. 1976). This standard is difficult to pin
down; there does not appear to be an EEOC regulation defining "minority" for purposes of
reporting. According to the Steelworkers' brief to the Supreme Court, minority beneficiaries
have been and are likely to be black; hence "minority" and "black" were used interchange-
ably. Furthermore, the program also established craft-training goals for women, "although
successful female bidders for such vacancies regardless of race may be counted against the
50% reserved for minorities." Brief for Petitioner United Steelworkers of America at 2 n.1,
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
73 The trial court concluded that there was no evidence that Kaiser had developed this
program with a view to correcting the effects of prior discrimination at any of its plants.
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. La. 1976). The
court, on the contrary, found that the primary motivation of the company-a contractor
with the federal government---"appears [to have been] satisfying the requirements of OFCC,
and avoiding vexatious litigation by minority employees." Id. at 765.
74 Id. at 770.
75 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
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phasized the district court's finding that Kaiser had not been
guilty of any past employment discrimination at its Gramercy
plant.7' The Supreme Court, as we already know, upheld the Kai-
ser plan and reversed the decision of the court of appeals.
A. The Opinions
1. Justice Brennan. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan
passed over the more candid and superficially appealing argument
advanced by Kaiser and the Department of Justice (as amicus cu-
riae) and accepted by Judge Wisdom, dissenting below." That ar-
gument-to which we shall return-had stressed the need to up-
hold programs such as Kaiser's in order to promote voluntary
compliance with Title VII while protecting employers and unions
from the intolerable dilemma we have already mentioned-the risk
of litigation by blacks if employers failed to adopt preferential pro-
grams and by whites if they did.7 8
Instead, Justice Brennan chose to rely on that part of the
Steelworkers' argument that stressed, not the employer's dilemma
generated by regulatory developments, but rather the original
meaning of the Act, read in light of its legislative history. Three
provisions of Title VII (sections 703(a) (1),79 703(a)(2)80 and
703(d) 1 ) appeared, however, to foreclose, with unusual clarity, the
Court's construction. A reference to those provisions is appropriate
at this point because they shaped both Justice Brennan's support-
76 Id. at 224. The court also stressed the finding below that societal discrimination had
no effect on the seniority of any party to the litigation. Id. at 226.
7 Id. at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
7' It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
80 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-. .. (2) to limit, seg-
regate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
81 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or re-
training, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individ-
ual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or em-
ployment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
Id. § 2000e-2(d) (emphasis added).
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ing argument and -the differing approaches of some of his
brethren.8 2
Section 703(a), the central provision of the Act, appears to
outlaw all discrimination against an individual on grounds of race.
Although there is no definition of "discrimination" in that sec-
tion-or, indeed, anywhere, in the statute-the pertinent internal
context indicates that to impose any disadvantage on an individ-
ual8 3 in hiring, employment, or training, on the basis of race, is "to
discriminate" within the meaning of section 703(a)(1). Further-
more, section 703(a)(2), which covered Brian Weber's complaint,
plainly makes it unlawful for an employer to classify his employees
on the basis of race. In short, the statutory language on its face
seeks to insulate all employment decisions against the influence of
racial considerations.8 4
Consequently, Justice Brennan could scarcely find any ambi-
guity in the terms of the statute. On the contrary, he virtually con-
ceded that Brian Weber's claim was supported by a literal inter-
pretation of the Act. But that claim was, the Justice concluded,
incompatible with the Act's spirit and purpose:" Congress's pri-
82 Also appropriate is a characteristically sage observation by Professor Corbin in a dif-
ferent context:
[A]n interpretation is not to be scorned merely because it seems obvious; words are,
indeed, not to be condemned because they seem plain and clear and unambiguous.
Clarity of expression is a merit-a somewhat unusual one. There are cases in which the
words of the writing are ambiguous to nobody ....
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161,
172 (1965).
83 In Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), Justice
Stevens, speaking for the Court, declared: "The statute's focus on the individual is unam-
biguous." Id. at 708. Although the Court was divided in Manhart, none of the three other
opinions questioned that proposition. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 408, 416 n.19 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
84 Justice Brennan did not treat the question presented by Weber as if the operative
statutory language consisted of "to discriminate," with a corresponding question as to
whether "benign" or "fair" discrimination, as well as "malign" or "unfair" discrimination
were outlawed. Some defenders of the result in Weber appear first to argue as if the opera-
tive proscription covered "discrimination" or "to discriminate" and then to argue that that
proscription is ambiguous and should be interpreted to reach only "invidious discrimina-
tion" and not discrimination involved in an "affirmative action plan to help establish genu-
ine racial equality." Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Dec.
20, 1979, at 37. After finding ambiguity in "discrimination," Professor Dworkin urged that
Weber could not properly be decided by looking only at the statutory language and sub-
scribed in general (but not completely) to Justice Brennan's view of the legislative history
and the precedents. Id. at 40-42. As shown below, Dworkin's approach is highly
questionable.
85 443 U.S. at 201-02. Justice Brennan quoted only two items of legislative history in
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mary aim had been to open to blacks jobs from which they had
traditionally been barred.s Brian Weber's proposed interpretation
was unacceptable because it would prohibit effective steps by pri-
vate firms to accomplish that purpose.8 7 Quoting the late Senator
Humphrey, the Justice observed that it would
be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a nation's concern over
centuries of injustice and intended to improve the lot of those
who had "been excluded from the American dream for so
long," . . . constituted the first legislative prohibition of all
voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."'
Justice Brennan found an additional and important justification
for his position in section 703(j) of the Act, which provides that
nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to require an employer to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or group because of
a racial imbalance in the employer's work force. 9 The Justice
urged that use of "require" rather than "require or permit" shows
that "Congress chose not to forbid voluntary race-conscious affirm-
ative action" to redress racial imbalance.90 In addition, such a
blanket prohibition would, he urged, conflict with the concern
about excessive federal regulation that had been expressed in the
legislative debates.91
support of his proposition that Congress "did not intend wholly to prohibit private and
voluntary affirmative action efforts." Id. at 203-04. One was, as Justice Rehnquist observed,
taken out of context and did not even deal with employment. Id. at 229 n.11 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The other quotation, ignored by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent, was a state-
ment of Representative MacGregor, delivered shortly before the final vote on Title VII. See
id. at 207-08 n.7. That statement, however, is so far out of step with the rest of Title VII's
voluminous legislative history that it is not entitled to significant weight.
86 Id. at 202.
87 Id. at 204.
Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
89 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976). For the text of the section, see note 26 supra.
443 U.S. at 204-06.
91 Id. at 206-07. Weber did not mention section 1981 of Title 42. That statute lacks a
provision resembling section 703(j), which provides that Title VII should not be interpreted
to require preferential treatment, see text at note 89 supra. This difference in the statutes
appears to cast a shadow on the kind of affirmative action upheld by Weber. This difficulty
apparently has led to suggestions that the Court should correct its alleged error in McDon-
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), by now holding that section 1981,
insofar as it protects whites against racially discriminatory discharge, is not within Con-
gress's power under the thirteenth amendment. See Note, The Thirteenth Amendment and
Private Affirmative Action, 89 YALE L.J. 399, 402 (1979). But even if the Court should repu-
diate its position in McDonald with respect to the thirteenth amendment, it could rely on
the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment as a modern constitutional foundation
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Section 703(j) also served as the basis for the Court's effort to
distinguish Bakke.2 Justice Brennan sought to explain the omis-
sion of a comparable clause in Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act-the Title at issue in Bakke-on the ground that Title VI had
been enacted under the congressional power over federal expendi-
tures and was intended to incorporate the equal protection stan-
dards of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, whereas Title VII
had been based on the commerce power and had been designed to
regulate' private action." Given these different constitutional ba-
ses, the Justice suggested, in a footnote, that Titles VI and VII
should not be read "in pari materia. ' '94
It is convenient to indicate here why the Court's attempted
distinction between Weber and Bakke is, in my opinion, a failure.
The suggestion that different constitutional bases for the two titles
imply different meanings for the antidiscrimination principle en-
acted by each of them is not supported by any functional consider-
ation, and ignores the fact that both titles incorporated a broad
antidiscrimination principle. 95 Furthermore, the suggestion that in-
terpretafions of these two titles should be kept separate disregards
the relationship-a relationship accepted by all the Justices in
Bakke96-between them evidenced by their common language,
for proscribing employment discrimination against all races, including whites. To be sure,
questions of construction arise when section 1981 meets programs of "reverse discrimina-
tion." But these questions are no more formidable than those involved in Weber and are
likely to be dispatched in the same way.
92 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9' See 443 U.S. at 206 n.6. The focus in Bakke was the meaning attached by Congress
to the term "discriminate." In Weber, the majority largely ignored the debates that focused
specifically on the meaning of that term, see, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 8921 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Williams).
"' 443 U.S. at 206 n.6. But cf. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979) (finding, in
a divided opinion, Title VII decisions apposite in interpreting a federal statute funding cer-
tain schools with special needs occasioned by desegregation programs).
95 See M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 99-100
(1966).
96 All the Justices treated decisions under Title VII as relevant to questions arising
under Title VI. See 438 U.S. at 301-02 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 340 n.17, 353-55, 366-68
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part); id. at 413 n.12, 416 n.19 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart
and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Further-
more, Justice Stevens observed that Titles VI and VII each reflected the belief of Congress
that "the principle of individual equality, without regard to race or religion," commanded a
national consensus. Id. at 416 n.19 (emphasis in original). Finally, he recognized that both of
these titles had a force independent of, and in addition to, that found in the Constitution.
Id. at 416-17.
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purpose, and history."'
Justice Brennan explicitly declined to go beyond the case
before him and to delineate the scope and limits of the principle
governing the validity of voluntary preferences." Nor, as we will
see later, did his listing of those aspects of the Kaiser-Steelworkers
Union plan that in combination made for its legality do much to
dissipate the murkiness inherent in the Court's avowedly ad hoc
approach. Furthermore, Justice Brennan expressly refused to pass
on the legality of court-ordered quotas as a remedy for proven vio-
lations of the Act,99 or to consider'"0 the effect of Executive Order
11,246.11
2. Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun joined in the Court's
opinion, but added a separate concurrence. Although acknowledg-
ing his "misgivings"' 1 2 as to the extent to which the legislative his-
tory supported the Court's result, Justice Blackmun found justifi-
cation for the result in "additional considerations, practical and
equitable, only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th
Congress."'10 3 Those considerations were the pressures on employ-
ers generated by administrative and judicial developments subse-
quent to the passage of Title VII-pressures that Justice Brennan
had chosen to ignore. Quoting from Judge Wisdom's dissent, Jus-
tice Blackmun highlighted the dilemmas created by a literal read-
ing of the Act:
The broad prohibition against discrimination places the em-
ployer and the union on. . . a "high tightrope without a net
beneath them." If Title VII is read literally, on the one hand
they face liability for past discrimination against blacks, and
97 See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), quoted in Weber, 443 U.S. at
229 n.11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
,8 443 U.S. at 200, 208. The Justice, noting the absence of state action, suggested that
Weber did not involve an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion. This suggestion ignores the fact that a federal statute permitting a preference for one
race but not another plainly involves governmental action. Nevertheless, a plaintiff who sues
a private party, rather than the government, for action permitted by such a statute may be
said to be challenging private action. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
This method of avoiding the constitutional question would be unavailable, however, if a unit
of the federal or a state government, now subject to Title VII, adopted a Kaiser-type prefer-
ence. Plainly, the Court's reliance on the state action point is at best a delaying action.
9 443 U.S. at 200.
'00 Id. at 209 n.9.
101 See text and notes at notes 56-58 supra.
102 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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on the other they face liability to whites for any voluntary
preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of prior discrimi-
nation against blacks.104
In order to protect employers and, more importantly, to pro-
mote their "voluntary compliance," Justice Blackmun would have
adopted the approach urged in Weber by the government and Kai-
ser, although not the defendant-union, and approved by Judge
Wisdom: "[E]mployers and unions who [have] committed 'argu-
able violations' of Title VII should be free to make reasonable re-
sponses without fear of liability to whites."105 The Justice sug-
gested that such a standard, although granting employers a privi-
lege to engage in preferential hiring, was a sensible resolution of "a
practical problem in the administration of Title VII." 1 06 This em-
phasis on practical problems for employers arising from the pres-
sures generated by regulation was, of course, not altogether consis-
tent with the Court's emphasis on the "voluntary" nature of the
preferences involved in Weber-an emphasis that Justice Black-
mun did not question.
3. Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist's dissent1 7 concen-
104 Id. at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
-1 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Brief for Petitioner Kaiser at
22, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The Steelworkers in Weber had
rejected that position and had also urged that under Title VII, courts lacked authority to
impose remedial group preferences. Brief for Petitioner United Steelworkers at 76-83,
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). If the Steelworkers' position had been
adopted, a union with "power" could veto, or significantly affect, particular affirmative ac-
tion programs, without fear of judicial requirements of "remedial" group quotas.
10" 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun referred to the possi-
bility of correction by Congress if the Court had "misperceived the political will." See id. at
216. Corrective legislation would, however, appear to involve a major, time consuming, and
nationally divisive effort. That effort would, moreover, be complicated by the Court's deci-
sion, for there would be cries that corrective legislation would be turning the civil rights
clock back. Justice Blackmun thus appears to have passed over the ways in which the
framework for corrective legislation has been shaped by the Court's ostensibly judicial act.
In any event, frequent resort to the Justice's argument in nonconstitutional cases would
convert the Court into a council of legislative revision empowered to rewrite the mandate of
Congress.
107 The Chief Justice joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent but also filed his own separate
dissent, stating that the majority had reached a result-the legalization of some quotas
favorable to blacks-that he would support as a legislator considering a proposed amend-
ment to Title VII. 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). His endorsement of the Court's
end served to highlight his criticism of the Court's means, which he termed "intellectually
dishonest." Id. at 219 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist disavowed not only the
Court's means but also its end, describing the Court's chosen device-the quota-as the
"numerus clausus... a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order
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trated on the opinion of the majority and made only a brief refer-
ence to Justice Blackmun's emphasis on subsequent developments
as justifying an arguable-violation approach.108
Complaining of the Court's Orwellian approach,109 Justice
Rehnquist criticized the majority for eluding "clear statutory lan-
guage, 'uncontradicted' legislative history," 1 0 and its own uniform
precedents.11 In his lengthy and vigorous opinion, he relentlessly
documented each of those criticisms. To be sure, he conceded that
the legislative debates focused primarily on compulsory quotas,
rather than voluntary ones.112 But he pointed to numerous
passages that stressed that employers were not to be permitted" 3
to discriminate in favor of either blacks or whites, and that racial
quotas in employment- voluntary or involuntary-were to be for-
bidden. The power of his opinion is in part the power of repetition,
and a summary cannot convey the force of his argument based on
the legislative history.
Justice Rehnquist also effectively disposed of the argument,
central to the Court's position, that the use of "require" in section
703(j) implied that "voluntary" racial preferences were not to be
prohibited. His analysis was clear and direct: section 703(j) had
been a response to criticism that the Act would be interpreted by
courts and official agencies to require employers with racially un-
balanced work forces to grant preferential treatment to minori-
ties.1 4 Consequently, that section was added to prevent courts and
agencies from imposing quotas. 15 There had been at that time no
need to deal with truly voluntary, as well as officially required, ra-
to prefer another." Id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1o8 See id. at 225 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist dismissed this the-
ory as apparently resting "on the conclusion that an employer is free to correct arguable
discrimination against his black employees by adopting measures that he knows will dis-
criminate against his white employees." Id. (emphasis in original).
109 Id. at 219-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976)). In McDonald, the Court concluded that "Title VII prohibits
racial discrimination against the white petitioners [plaintiffs] in this case upon the same
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes." 427 U.S. at 280.
443 U.S. at 221 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
,12 Id. at 244 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
,' See, e.g., id. at 232-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). President Johnson's radio and
television remarks upon signing the bill were to the same effect. While stressing that men
were being denied the blessings of liberty because of their color, he said of the bill, "It does
not give special treatment to any citizen." See II PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B.
JOHNSON 445-46 (1965).
.1. 433 U.S. at 244-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1"5 Id. at 246 n.24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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cial preferences, for the language of Title VII, as proponents and
opponents of the bill both understood, plainly banned voluntary
quotas."' And to bar officials from compelling action otherwise in-
compatible with clear statutory provisions and purposes was not to
authorize equally incompatible private action."1
Justice Rehnquist noted the ironic elements of the majority
opinions. He pointed first to the Court's labeling of the Kaiser plan
as "voluntary" even though it had been induced by official pres-
sure on Kaiser from government agencies enforcing Executive Or-
der 11,246,118 and then to the Court's upholding that plan by in-
voking section 703(j), which had been designed to insulate
employers against government pressures for quotas. By this tour
de force the Court permitted the government to do exactly what
opponents of the bill said the government would do, what the pro-
ponents said section 703(a) forbade, and what section 703(j) for-
bade again in an "excess" of caution.119
Justice Rehnquist added the final blow by pointing to section
703(i) of Title VII, 20 which expressly permits firms on or near In-
dian reservations to grant publicly announced preferences for Indi-
ans living close by.12 Naturally, the Justice suggested that the In-
dian-preference provision showed Congress knew how to authorize
preferences and would have used more exact language had it in-
tended to except all voluntary preferences in favor of blacks from
the blanket prohibition of racial discrimination. 2
2
It is worth noting that Justice Rehnquist's textual and histori-
cal analysis is wholly compatible with the statutory purpose identi-
fied by the majority-to help blacks get jobs. Under the statute
that end, however, was to be advanced by a particular means: by
incorporating into law the equal opportunity that had for so long
been denied blacks. It was clear in 1964, as it is today, that assur-
ing such opportunity would help blacks enter the economic main-
116 Id. at 245 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17 Section 706(g) of Title VII carefully limits judicial authority for court-ordered "af-
firmative action" even when an employer or union has been found guilty of intentional dis-
crimination. See text and notes at notes 137-153 infra. Those careful limitations run counter
to the conclusion that Congress authorized private entities to grant race-conscious remedies
in order to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination or to respond to "arguable discrim-
ination" of their own.
I' 443 U.S. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also M. SOVERN, supra note 95, at 70.
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976).
121 443 U.S. at 253 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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stream. At that time, the pressing problem was not how to secure
or to validate preferences in employment for blacks but how to se-
cure for them equal opportunity-an opportunity to function on
the basis of individual qualification or "merit," free from group
prejudice or stereotyping. 123
In this connection, it is worth recalling that for over a genera-
tion successive efforts to enact federal legislation designed to pro-
tect blacks, among others, against such employment discrimination
had failed. 124 It was only after the extraordinary events of the early
1960s, including the assassination of President Kennedy, that the
necessary consensus for successful action against such discrimina-
tion at last emerged. The history of prior failures, coupled with the
course of debate in 1964, made it clear that federal legislation en-
suring equal opportunity for blacks probably could not have been
enacted then if whites had not been promised and granted the
same protection.
Furthermore, a sweeping antidiscrimination principle encom-
passing all races had deep moral roots, independent of the legisla-
tive history of the 1964 Act; equal opportunity for individuals and
the irrelevance of their membership in particular racial groups had
been a classic but unrealized goal of American society. To be sure,
equal opportunity, without concern for unequal conditions, could
be an idle ritual. But, as sympathetic commentators on Title VII
stressed soon after its enactment,12 5 the attack on unequal condi-
tions was not to be based on race or to involve selective employ-
ment discrimination against "innocent whites." Instead, that at-
tack was to be based on need or disadvantage' 26 -a criterion that
cut across racial lines and that was a better measure of inequality
of condition and less troublesome-morally and politically-than
race.
B. The Arguable-Violation Approach
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, conceded that Congress,
when it enacted Title VII, "probably thought" that the statutory
principle of nondiscrimination "would apply to blacks and whites
121 See M. SOVERN, supra note 95, at 211.
"' See Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The
More Remedies, the Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1974).
I" See, e.g., M. SOVERN, supra note 95, at 211-12.
126 Id.
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alike."' 21 7 After this candid acknowledgement that the Court was
engaging in judicial nullification, the Justice set forth his justifica-
tions. They cast light on the entire course of decisions under Title
VII as well as on the Court's approach in Weber. They also raise
formidable questions as to the role of the Court and the limits of
adjudication. Accordingly, Justice Blackmun's reasons, although he
spoke only for himself, invite special attention.
As we have seen, his primary justification for excluding whites
from the protection of the statutory nondiscrimination principle
was to advance "voluntary compliance" with that principle as it
applied to blacks. 128 By allowing employers who had committed ar-
guable violations of Title VII to engage in preferential hiring, the
Court would enable those employers to redress (arguable) discrimi-
nation without fear of incurring liability to whites. In reworking
and limiting the broad color-free standard of the Act he would not,
however, have gone beyond the implications of that justification.
He accordingly expressed concern that the Court, by allowing pref-
erential hiring even in the absence of arguable violations, had en-
croached excessively on the color-blind standard of Title VII;129
the majority's approach would abrogate the statutory standard
even where the employer was not on a "high tightrope without a
net.13 0
The Justice advanced two principal reasons for overcoming his
concerns. First, given the significance of statistical imbalance in
Title VII litigation, the Court's approach and his would not, in
practice, be significantly different.' 3' The standard for an arguable
violation would have had to be set low enough so that it could be
met without an employer's admitting a violation of Title VII.13 2
Furthermore, proof of an actual violation by the employer should
not be required in cases like Weber as a condition for upholding
racial preferences, for neither party in Weber had had an incentive
to establish such a violation, and EEOC intervention in all such
cases would not be feasible.' In short, the Justice acknowledged
127 443 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also id. at 209.
128 Id. at 209-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
130 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
131 Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
12 Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33 Id. at 213-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Counsel for Brian Weber had kept the
EEOC advised of the litigation from its inception. Brief for Respondent Weber at 22,
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Even though the EEOC cannot inter-
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that the arguable-violation standard would be satisfied by proof of
a statistical imbalance between the proportion of minorities in a
given job category and the proportion of minorities in the relevant
labor market-as would, of course, the majority's standard.134
Hence, questions about the qualifications of the minorities in that
market and about whether the statistical disparity resulted from
pre-Act or societal discrimination would not have to be considered.
The emphasis, as the Justice put it, would be on "arguable" rather
than on "violation. '13 5
The Justice also found "strong considerations of equity" sup-
porting an interpretation of Title VH that would permit private
affirmative action to reach pre-Act employment discrimination, as
well as the effects of societal discrimination.1 36
1. Equitable Considerations: The Nature of the Remedy.
The Justice did not pinpoint the equitable considerations that he
considered pertinent. Nor did he deal with elements in the case
that suggested that it was Brian Weber who could have made an
appeal to equity 37 even if Kaiser had been guilty of arguable or
actual offenses under Title VII.
The crux of Weber's equitable claim was that there was no
relationship between those injured by Kaiser's (arguable) offenses
and those benefited by the remedy adopted by Kaiser and the
Steelworkers. In short, the remedy devised by Kaiser and the
Steelworkers did not fit the wrong. Thus, to take a concrete case,
let us assume that Kaiser's discrimination had consisted of its
prior requirement of experience for craft employment-a require-
ment that excluded a disproportionately high number of blacks
and that might not have met the business necessity test.138 Kaiser
and the Steelworkers would have been wholly justified in terminat-
ing that requirement and in granting back pay to blacks who
showed that they had been adversely affected by it. Kaiser might
even have been justified in granting make-whole restorative senior-
vene in "every case," that disability would not explain its abstention in Weber-a conspicu-
ously important case. In any event, when litigants appear to lack pertinent incentives, a trial
court could remedy that defect by appointing a litigating amicus, among other expedients.
234 443 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 214-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Indeed, adding insult to injury, the Justice
suggested that Brian Weber's attack on the Kaiser plan seemed "unfair," id.-a suggestion
that seems especially puzzling, given the result in Bakke.
'37 See Cohen, Why Racial Preference is Illegal and Immoral, COMMENTARY, June 1979,
at 40, 44.
M' See text and notes at notes 29-31 supra.
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ity to individual victims, at the expense of black or white employ-
ees who had benefited, however innocently, from the prior
discrimination.
Such individuated remedies, however, were not at issue in
Weber, for there was absolutely no evidence that the blacks who
benefited from Kaiser's preferential program had been victims of
prior discrimination. Even within the terms of Justice Blackmun's
formulation, it is difficult to see the basis for characterizing as
"reasonable" a program of self-correction that involves such a
manifestly bad fit between victims of the wrong and beneficiaries
of the remedy.
The difficulties involved are sharpened by the substantial
doubts that existed prior to Weber that a court-even after finding
discrimination by Kaiser-would have been authorized to order
such an ill-fitting remedy. It is true, as already indicated, that
many lower courts, after finding a violation of Title VII or the
Constitution, have granted such relief." 9 But the Supreme Court
has not squarely approved that position, and considerable doubt as
to its propriety arises from the language14 0 and legislative history
of the Act.""
In exploring that issue, it is, of course, necessary to distinguish
the group remedial quota from the "rightful place" remedy for in-
dividuals. The latter remedy is wholly consistent with the focus of
the statute on individuals and was approved in Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co.,'4 2 in which the Supreme Court upheld class-
based seniority relief for identifiable victims of employment dis-
crimination, retroactive to the date of the application for employ-
ment. In approving such relief, under section 706(g) of the Act,143
the Court emphasized that the "central 'make-whole'" principle of
Title VII justified whatever adverse effect such a remedy might
have on other employees;14 furthermore, a similar practice was
standard under the National Labor Relations Act 4 5 ("NLRA")
-the model for the remedial sections of Title VII.' 6
It is worth recalling that, in Bowman, Justice Powell dissented
139 See cases cited notes 46-47 supra.
140 For the text of section 706(g), see note 153 infra.
141 See note 52 supra.
"' 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
143 Id. at 779.
141 Id. at 774.
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
140 424 U.S. at 769, 774.
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from the Court's approach to make-whole remedies, urging that it
virtually commanded lower courts to grant such relief without
weighing the equitable claims of "innocent incumbents."14 Plainly,
these equities are even stronger when an employer's preferences
impose costs on innocent employees and grant benefits to individu-
als who have not been the victims of discrimination.148 These im-
plications of Justice Powell's dissent are reinforced by the decision
of the Court, written by Justice Stewart, in International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States.1' 9 Even in the face of proof of
a pattern and practice of discrimination by the employer, the
Court in Teamsters ruled that the offending employer could avoid
liability to an individual applicant by showing that the applicant
had been rejected for other than racial reasons. 50
Another impediment to group remedies is the Court's ap-
proach in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,' 5' where it concluded that the
remedial provisions of the NLRA are limited by the substantive
principles of that Act. The Court stressed that under those princi-
ples, collective bargaining agreements are to be worked out by the
parties and not to be imposed by government. 52 Accordingly, the
17 Id. at 795 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See note 43 supra.
148 Cohen, supra note 137. In Bakke, Justice Powell referred to decisions by courts of
appeals that "fashioned various types of racial preferences as remedies for constitutional or
statutory violations resulting in identified, race-based injuries to individuals held entitled
to the preference." 438 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the cases he cited had
approved preferences for members of particular racial groups even though the individual
beneficiaries had not been identified as victims of the offenses involved. In Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), the court
established quotas as high as 3:1 (black:white) in order to "eradicate the effects of past
discriminatory practices," id. at 1340. The court did not, however, specify which "effects"
the decree corrected, nor did it make any effort to grant the benefit of "remedial" quotas to
actual victims of discrimination. There was a similar lack of specificity in the other case
relied on by the Justice, Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The court there did, however, identify as a "present effect" the
employer's bad reputation in the minority community. Id. at 331.
149 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Bakke, Justice Stewart, disagreeing with Justice Brennan,
had joined in Justice Stevens's opinion, declaring that Title VI bans the use of race-con-
scious standards by the institutions that it covers. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 414 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In
Weber, Justice Stewart joined Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court despite its obvious
tensions with the opinions by Justices Stevens and Powell in Bakke. Justice Stewart's join-
ing the Court in Weber may have been linked with the Court's careful reservation of the
question regarding judicial authority to order "remedial" quotas. 443 U.S. at 211.
150 See 431 U.S. at 362. See also text and note at note 155 infra.
'-' 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
152 Id. at 107-08. But cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-16 (1969) (up-
holding bargaining order as a remedy where employer's unfair labor practices found to have
spoiled chance for fair election).
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Court held that it was beyond the authority of the National Labor
Relations Board to remedy an employer's refusal to bargain about
a check-off provision by requiring him to include such a provision
in his collective agreement. A similar approach under Title VII
would require courts to take account of the language and purpose
of section 703(j)-which bars imposition of quotas-when delineat-
ing the scope of section 706(g),' s the remedial provision of the Act.
Such an approach would permit preferences under Title VII only
when necessary to make individual victims, as distinguished from
racial groups, whole.' 54
There would be obvious anomalies in an interpretation of Ti-
tle VII that denied courts authority to require that proven viola-
tors grant group preferences while permitting employers to grant
"voluntary" preferences, despite similar adverse consequences for
innocent individuals in both situations. Courts in general could be
expected to give more careful and detached consideration to the
competing interests at stake15 5 than employers seeking protection
from official and private pressures for "quotification" of their work
forces.
153 Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsi-
ble for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate .... No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstate-
ment of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promo-
tion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment
or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimina-
tion on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
This section, especially if read in conjunction with section 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(0)
(1976), suggests that preferences are allowed only to make identifiable victims of discrimina-
tion whole.
In Weber, Justice Brennan, without referring to precedents under the NLRA, stated
that "remedies for substantive violations are governed by § 706(g)" while also stating that
"[s]ection 703(j) speaks to substantive liability under Title VII." 443 U.S. at 205 n.5.
1'4 Indeed, the NLRB, when it finds that an employer, in order to avert unionization,
has discriminated against union members in hiring, orders affirmative action in the form of
back pay and reinstatement to identified victims of such discrimination. The Board has not,
to my knowledge, directed such an employer in future hiring to give preferential treatment
to union members who were not victims of the violation.
"I The district court in Weber stressed those considerations in concluding that courts,
but not private parties, were authorized to establish "quota systems where appropriate." 415
F. Supp. at 767-68.
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We need not pursue such anomalies here; they are obviously
part and parcel of the Court's emphasis in Weber on voluntarism
and the avoidance of overregulation. It is enough for our purposes
to observe that Justice Blackmun seemed to ignore that the
Court's opinion, which he joined, carefully reserved the question of
the propriety under Title VII of remedial group preferences. 15 6
Thus, he emphasized that the Weber litigants lacked an incentive
to establish Kaiser's prior discrimination. 1 7 But that point would
be important only if a judicial finding of such discrimination would
provide authority for a remedial decree mandating a program such
as Kaiser's. If courts lack such authority, the issue is simply
whether employers not shown to have violated the Act should have
greater authority to establish group preferences than courts deal-
ing with proven violators.
2. "Compliance" Through "Violation." In any event, Justice
Blackmun's emphasis on "arguable violations" and "voluntary"
compliance suffers from an obvious circularity. The arguable-viola-
tion approach is needed only if Title VII in general bars all em-
ployment discrimination-in favor of or against blacks. But if the
statute is read in that way, it is not clear (as Justice Rehnquist
noted15 ) why remedying arguable discrimination against members
of one group should justify actual and undeniable discrimination
against members of another group. In other words, even though it
is conceded that "voluntary compliance" is more important under
this statute than generally, the characterization of conduct as "vol-
untary" does not answer the question whether it constitutes com-
pliance. All of Justice Blackmun's subsidiary arguments seem to
beg that basic question and convert a broad antidiscrimination
principle into a question of whose ox is being gored.1 59
To notice the logical defects in the arguable-discrimination
approach is not to downplay the employer's dilemma generated by
developments under Title VII and Executive Order 11,246. Never-
theless, it is important that one keep in mind that the statute was
designed to regulate employers and to protect employees. If a
,56 443 U.S. at 200.
157 Id. at 213-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Contrary to the Justice's assumption, in
some situations the potential liability (pre-Weber) from "reverse discrimination" would be
so much greater than the liabilities from past discrimination against blacks that the incen-
tive to admit past discrimination would have existed-if it avoided the first kind of liability.
158 Id. at 225 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159 See A. BIcKEL, supra note 7, at 133, quoted in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 295 n.35 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
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choice must be made between a quieter life (or government con-
tracts) for employers and the abrogation of statutory protection for
some classes of employees, nothing in the statute suggests that it is
the employees' interests that should be sacrificed. 160
It is, moreover, likely that the safety net provided by Weber or
the arguable-violation theory will be less secure than Justice
Blackmun implied. 61 Thus, if a quota fixed for blacks should be
challenged by Hispanics, Asiatics or white women, it would be far
from clear that the one-to-one, black-white quota would stand up
in a labor market where blacks constitute 39% of the workers. On
the other hand, if the employer grants the blacks 39% of the pre-
ferred jobs and the blacks urge that that quota is inadequate re-
dress for "past discrimination," the voluntary preference may not
forestall litigation over both the existence of past discrimination
and the proper remedy for its identified victims. In short, Weber
may change the parameters for pressure by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance ("OFCC") and civil rights groups, rather
than substantially curb litigation about the responses to such pres-
sures. Moreover, to the extent that it does curb such litigation, it
may well do so only by reducing employers' incentives to resist
pressures in favor of granting some favored minority (or minori-
ties) a preference that is excessive in relation to the percentage of
that minority in some labor markets.
In any event, "voluntary" preferences for groups cannot wipe
out liability for past violations to identifiable individual victims.1 62
To be sure, such preferences may divert attention from past dis-
crimination against identifiable victims and may thereby reduce
litigation over their claims. But that reduction would presumably
be at the expense of adequate relief for such victims. Indeed, Jus-
tice Blackmun intimated that it is desirable that voluntary quotas
confuse things in this way.6 It is not clear, however, why the
160 An employer's difficulties are less acute in a case such as Weber, in which the relief
requested is not damages for past "reverse" discrimination but an injunction against its
continuation. It is true that such an injunction might prevent the employer from achieving
the ethnic proportionalities that might in turn encourage litigation by or on behalf of blacks.
But an injunction granted to a Brian Weber would presumably be given evidentiary weight
in a later action against the employer. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60
& n.21 (1974) (arbitral decision).
161 See text at notes 191-192 infra.
162 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 584 (1978) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[Kaiser] is able to avoid identifying
victims of past discrimination, and so avoids claims for back pay that would inevitably fol-
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Court should prefer a scheme that decreases the likelihood that
individual victims will seek relief.
3. "Additional Considerations, Practical and Equitable." It
is now useful to look more closely at Justice Blackmun's general
suggestion that "additional considerations, practical and equitable,
only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Con-
gress,"'164 support the Court's conclusion. It is worthy of emphasis
that these considerations (even assuming that they were not per-
ceived by Congress) are not changes in societal circumstances; on
the contrary, they consist of the judicial decisions and executive
practices that generated pressures for racial quotas despite resul-
tant tensions with the statutory language and history. These regu-
latory developments presented the Court in Weber with a mani-
festly difficult problem. One response was to accept the
idea-advanced by Justice Blackmun-that the language and orig-
inal purpose of the Act had been outdistanced by events. The diffi-
culty with that approach is plain. The superseding events were, as
already indicated, not external to regulation but rather were deci-
sions by the judiciary and the executive that ran counter to the
political and ethical bargain struck by the 88th Congress. Thus the
inadequate perceptions imputed to Congress consist principally of
its failure to realize that courts would so transform a broad an-
tidiscrimination principle as to encourage employment decisions
that discriminate against white males.le5 To invoke such develop-
ments as justification for reworking the central provision of the
low a response limited to such victims").
The pertinent difficulties are illustrated in the following situation: After the Civil
Rights Act became effective, an employer may have engaged in discrimination against two
black employees. In order to bolster his legal defenses against a lawsuit by them, he grants
preferences to two other blacks, who were not affected by the employer's wrong, at the ex-
pense of two whites, who were not benefited thereby. It is difficult to see why it is equitable
for voluntary action to impede a remedy for actual victims of discrimination, while granting
a preference to other blacks at the expense of whites who did not benefit from the prior
discrimination. When, as in Weber, the employer has not been found guilty of or acknowl-
edged actual discrimination against individual blacks, the equity of voluntary racial prefer-
ences surely does not become more appealing.
164 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1'5 Presumably, Congress (or some of its members) underestimated the difficulty of
ending various employment practices that were not explicitly or deliberately discriminatory
but that impeded access of blacks to jobs. Thus, in addition to standardized tests, employ-
ment criteria such as educational prerequisites, arrest records, garnishments, and interviews
might have an adverse impact on blacks, while lacking strong job-relatedness. Whatever the
congressional perceptions about such difficulties, the debates made it clear that quotas were
an impermissible method of dealing with impediments to equal employment opportunity.
See note 52 supra.
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statute involves a striking reversal of roles. It demonstrates a fail-
ure to recognize whose perceptions-the judiciary's or Con-
gress's-should be respected concerning a statute that was enacted
after debates that focused on the specific type of problem before
the Court.
Indeed, the Weber Court had another, albeit perhaps more
difficult alternative: to honor the language of the statute and the
political and ethical consensus it embodied. If doing so in a case
such as Weber placed innocent employers in intolerable situations,
the Court could reexamine and, if need be, revise its earlier prece-
dents.16  To be sure, such an approach would increase the risk that
an employer's covert discrimination might go undetected. This risk
of underenforcement of Title VII is a serious one. But it is not to
denigrate the statutory purposes or to be complacent about under-
enforcement to observe that the risk of imperfect. enforcement is
endemic to all regulation and cannot be curtailed significantly
without important costs to the integrity of our enforcement
processes. In the case of Title VII, that risk could be reduced with
respect to blacks by choosing to uphold clear and unequivocal dis-
crimination against whites-as was done in Weber. That choice,
however, validates explicit racial quotas is a part of our legal and
symbolic code and ignores the mandate reflected in the language,
the history, and the social matrix of the Act-a mandate for non-
discriminatory treatment for whites as well as blacks.
The Court's approach cannot be justified on the ground that
the change made by Weber is only a response to a minor hitch,
unforeseen by Congress, that often emerges as a statute is adminis-
tered. That change goes to the roots of the bargain struck by the
88th Congress, and to the roots of our color-blind aspiration.
Weber is, in fact, an important step in the transformation of the
classic and widely supported liberal ideal of equal opportunity for
individuals into a new program of equal outcomes for groups that
is both more divisive than the older ideal and fundamentally in-
consistent with it.
Ill. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE COURT'S ROLE
The meanings of "equality" and of "equal opportunity" and
For suggestions regarding corrective action, see, Glazer, Issues on Availability, in
PERSPECTIVES ON AVAILABILITY 217 (1977); Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse
Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17.
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their relationship to equity and efficiency have been the subjects of
a vast literature1 7 that cannot and need not be reviewed here. But
what merits emphasis is that choosing between competing values
underlying those concepts-under the guise of statutory construc-
tion-appears to have strained the Court's institutional compe-
tence. The Court's opinion does not even notice some basic and
troubling questions relevant to a disinterested and informed
choice. One need not romanticize the process of legislative investi-
gation or legislative decision to recognize that litigation is as ill-
suited for informing the Court about the pertinent questions as the
Court is for resolving them. In any event, in illustrating questions
neglected by the Court, I will point to those pivotal to the Court's
stated objective-helping blacks, and especially unemployed
blacks, 6 ' into the mainstream of our economy.
Is official pressure for affirmative action a substantial factor in
the flight of business from the centers of black population, as em-
ployers attempt to avoid pressure for quota hiring?8 9 As a conse-
147 For a discussion of some of the literature, see Simons, Book Review, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 513 (1979).
168 See 443 U.S. at 204 n.4 (indicating that ratio of nonwhite unemployment to white
unemployment had increased from 1962 to 1978). For a discussion of the diverse opinions
regarding the effects of government antidiscrimination programs on wages and unemploy-
ment of black workers, see Butler & Heckman, The Government's Impact on the Labor
Market Status of Black Americans: A Critical Review, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 235, 265-67 (1977). See also J. SmrrH & F. WELCH, RACE DIFFERENCES IN EARN-
INGS: A SURVEY AND Naw EVIDENCE (Rand Report No. R-2295-NSF 1978); W. WILSON, THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 88-121 (1978).
161 For indications that affirmative action requirements are a factor in the location of
new plants in areas with few minority residents, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1978, § 1, at 18
col. 1. See also Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 373 (1966) (recognizing the force of
this consideration but noting that it can be overdone).
The EEOC has indeed challenged relocation from urban to suburban locations. E.g.,
EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 466 F. Supp. 783, 787 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (charge dis-
missed on the ground that move prompted by self-preservation rather than by "race"). See
also Note, Suburban Relocation of Urban Employers-A Contemporary Problem in Em-
ployment Discrimination, 62 IowA L. REV. 427 (1976). Industrial flight from concentrations
of minority workers may frustrate the underlying purposes of Title VII. But the location or
relocation of a plant depends on many factors, including perhaps the desire to avoid "un-
derutilization" of minorities in a work force. To apply Title VII and the disparate impact
and business necessity test to plant relocation would confer on courts sweeping powers
whose far-reaching implications for the economy need not be explored here. Cf. Local 57,
Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.)
(runaway plant as violation of NLRA), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967). See also NLRB v.
Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961). Plainly, such judicial control would involve
the sharpest tensions with the avoidance of overregulation found to be an important con-
gressional purpose by the Court in Weber. See text and note at note 91 infra.
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quence, are the most disadvantaged blacks being hurt by regula-
tion designed to help them? Will those hoping to cultivate the
grievances of whites in order to promote bigotry now be able to
march under an honorable banner-equal opportunity for all? Will
the fallout from Weber intensify racial politics and further polarize
our work forces and our communities?1 70 Will it obstruct impor-
tant job training across racial lines-the spontaneous on-the-job
instruction of one worker by another? Will Weber and the
centrifugal tendencies that it promotes create further obstacles to
legislative action necessary for programs designed to help all the
disadvantaged, black and white? Will quota hiring result in signifi-
cant inefficiencies-thereby retarding economic growth, to the par-
ticular disadvantage of minorities? And, on a different point, can a
shift from individual to group "rights" be stabilized anywhere
short of a transformation of the basic values of our society and our
political, legal, and economic institutions-short of a virtually
"quotified society"?
These illustrative questions are not only legislative and politi-
cal but also, as already indicated, critical to the achievement of the
purpose the Court imputed to Congress. There is no indication
that the Court considered them. On the other hand, the Court, in
disposing of Weber without appropriate regard for Congress's man-
date, risks its future capacity to discharge an important judicial
function, that of satisfying a deeply felt need for trustworthy neu-
trals, as Professor Dawson put it.' 7 '
The liberties taken by the Court contributed to Weber's fail-
ing a classic test for a Supreme Court opinion: that it give reason-
able explanations transcending the result in the case being de-
cided."" Although Weber affects virtually the entire work force, it
does not provide coherent guidance to private lawyers who must
give day-to-day advice, to government officials with enforcement
responsibilities, or to judges who must deal with a flood of litiga-
tion. The Court, as we have seen,178 emphasized that it was decid-
ing only the case before it. This strategy of ostensible postpone-
ment adds still another ironic twist to a decision motivated in part
by arguments that something had to be done to alleviate the un-
1O See generally Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Ap-
praisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1044-45 (1979); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Cui. L. REv. 775,1805-08 (1979).
" J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW xvi (1968).
112 See id. at xi-xii.
173 See text and note at note 98 supra.
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certainties resulting from ambivalent regulations.
IV. THE REACH OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS
The narrowness of the Court's opinion may, despite Justice
Brennan's efforts, turn out to be more apparent than real. The dis-
tinctive elements of Weber stressed by the Court are in the main
so unrelated to its basic argument that, if the Court persists in its
fundamental position, those elements are unlikely to have any im-
portance. Furthermore, they are in general so ill-defined that they
fail to provide a basis for a limiting rule. In order to develop these
points, it is appropriate to review those elements of the Kaiser
plan emphasized by the Court.
First, even as to blacks, quotas in Weber were validated only
with respect to "traditionally segregated job categories 1 7 4 in the
private sector. Since the Court did not delineate those categories,
its opinion leaves unanswered many questions: Do jobs once "tra:
ditionally segregated" remain so and, if so, for how long after black
representation has markedly increased? Does the Court's emphasis
mean that quotas may not be established for relatively new job
categories, such as computer programmers, if such categories have
not involved any racial exclusion in the past but at present involve
a racial imbalance? Does "traditionally segregated" mean anything
more than current racial imbalance? 17 5 How are job categories to
be defined for these purposes? If, for example, the relevant rubric
were "white collar" jobs, computer programmers might easily fit
under a "traditionally segregated" category; the result might be
different if the rubric were "computer programmers." And is tradi-
tional segregation to be determined on a national, regional, or local
basis? In any event, if "traditionally segregated" were narrowly
construed, the option that Weber grants to employers might not
extend to relatively new and growing sectors of the economy.
1:74 443 U.S. at 209.
7 6 In connection with this question, it is worth noting that the Court expressly took
judicial notice of numerous decisions rendered after the enactment of Title VII that had
rested on findings of deliberate racial exclusion from crafts. See id. at 198 n.1. These find-
ings primarily involved the construction trades. The Court, moreover, also referred to gen-
eral studies of pre-Act discrimination. The Court did not, however, pinpoint the extent to
which industrial unions (as distinguished from craft unions) and employers had engaged in
racial discrimination. To be sure, discrimination in construction and in society presumably
reduced the pool of skilled blacks available for factory jobs. But the Court's failure to con-
sider possible differences in the construction and other industries, respectively, coupled with
its indifference to the absence of demonstrated discrimination at Kaiser, contributes to the
uncertainties spawned by its opinion.
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A similar limitation may be implicit in the Court's emphasis
that Weber involved a private employer. For the public sector has
in the last decade been the faster growing part of our economy.
The Court's emphasis might be explained on the ground that gov-
ernmental quotas would involve the state directly in racial discrim-
ination, thereby raising troublesome constitutional questions. 176
But Title VII now also applies to the public sector and does not by
its terms draw a distinction between the validity of "voluntary"
quotas developed by private and public employers, respectively.
Accordingly, it is likely that the Court will soon be faced with a
constitutional question arising from the claim that Title VII per-
mits "voluntary" quotas by public bodies, qua employers.177
Another source of uncertainty is implicit in the Court's reiter-
ation that the Kaiser program had been collectively bargained."'
Judge Wisdom, dissenting below-but not the Supreme
Court-sought to explain why that consideration was entitled to
weight. 7 He suggested that the duty of fair representation may*
reenforce internal restraints on a union's willingness to agree to
racial preferences adverse to a majority, or to many union constitu-
ents. It is difficult, however, to discern a basis for giving any legal
significance to that point. If Title VII bars all employment dis-
crimination by an employer, the union, by agreeing to a discrimi-
natory standard, is guilty of a breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation-at least if it has a specific discriminatory intent. 180 The
participating union may, moreover, also be guilty of a violation of
Title VII. The fact that internal union politics might limit the ex-
tent of its breach of duty or its statutory violation would not
change the fact that a breach by the union and a statutory viola-
tion by the employer and possibly by the union had occurred. On
17" The divergent opinions in the Bakke case indicate how deeply divided the Court is
on the question of the constitutionality of preferential treatment. See notes 96, 98 supra.
"I At least one federal court, relying on Weber without discussing its limitations, has
held lawful under Title VII a public employer's use of an allegedly remedial quota for
blacks. Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n v. Young, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1728, 1739-40 (6th
Cir. 1979). See also Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980).
178 443 U.S. at 197-99.
179 563 F.2d at 232-33 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
180 A union's proposal or acceptance of a discriminatory contract provision may violate
Title VII despite the union's good faith and reasonableness, whereas a breach of the duty of
fair representation generally presupposes bad faith and arbitrary action on the union's part.
See generally Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule, 64 MINN. L. REv. 183, 213-15 (1980);
Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARv. L. REv. 702, 703-05 & passim
(1980). Since the union has greater leeway under that duty, it is difficult to see its relevance
in the Weber context.
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the other hand, if, notwithstanding Title VII, an employer is enti-
tled to adopt "voluntary" programs of racial preference, it does not
appear to be legally significant that a union might restrain the ex-
tent to which an employer exercises that right.181
There are, moreover, aspects of a union's duty of fair represen-
tation that lend an air of perversity to suggestions that the exis-
tence of that duty should make it easier to uphold racial prefer-
ences. As Chief Justice Stone once observed, the duty is based on
"a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted
power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption towards
them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and be-
half.118 2 That principle was, to be sure, articulated in response to
discrimination against blacks within a bargaining unit.8 But it re-
flected a larger purpose to protect all individuals against arbitrary
action by those who purport to exercise collective power on their
behalf.18 4 To rely on the existence of that duty to justify collec-
tively bargained discrimination, albeit against whites in a bargain-
ing unit, is to ignore its basic function as a restraint on collective
power. Finally, collective bargaining agreements cover less than
25% of the work force. If the Court's approach is sound, it would
be bizarre to confine it to such a small part of the economy.1 85
The Court also seemed to attach some significance (1) to the
fact that the disputed Kaiser program did not constitute an abso-
lute bar to the admission of whites 86 and (2) to its own finding
'SI The Steelworkers in Weber agreed to a 50% quota for blacks in the training pro-
gram even though the blacks (relative qualifications aside) constituted at most 39% of the
relevant labor force. A quota greater than statistical parity is difficult for the employer to
justify, see text and notes at notes 187-190 infra, and even more so for the union, obliged as
it is to balance fairly the competing interests of all members of the bargaining unit.
:92 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
'83 Id. at 196.
18 The labor movement in the United States is passing into a new phase. The struggle
of the unions for recognition and rights to bargain, and of workmen for the right to join
without interference, seems to be culminating in a victory for labor forces. We appear
now to be entering the phase of struggle to reconcile the rights of individuals and mi-
norities with the power of those who control collective bargaining groups.
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 271 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
'"s Whatever importance ultimately attaches to a union's involvement in the negotia-
tion of an affirmative action plan, the situation created by the Court's opinion may well
result in heightening racial consciousness in labor-management relations. Thus, in organiz-
ing campaigns, Weber would provide a basis for an employer's arguing to white employees
that a union's victory-at least if the union's leadership is predominantly white-might fa-
cilitate lawful reverse discrimination.
I"' The Court noted that the plan did not deprive the whites of preexisting rights, such
as protection against layoffs based on seniority, but established new rights to training for
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that the plan was temporary, and "not intended to maintain racial
balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. '187
Again, it is difficult to fit those factors into the Court's argument.
Although whites were eligible for Kaiser's training program, the
50% of spaces allocated to blacks exceeded their ratio in the local
labor force. Thus, even if one accepted the dubious premise that,
absent discrimination, employment in particular plants (and their
various departments) would reflect the ethnic ratio of the sur-
rounding community,'88 that premise would not help to uphold the
Kaiser plan because the plan called for "overrepresentation" of
blacks in the training program.
Plainly, the Kaiser plan was developed, not as a prophylactic
against future discrimination by Kaiser, but as a catch-up remedy
for past discrimination by society.189 If such a "voluntary" remedy
is favored or tolerated as a way of helping blacks into the economic
mainstream, why should the law restrain an employer who wishes
to help blacks catch up even more quickly by reducing the ratio of
whites as well as blacks. 443 U.S. at 208. See also id. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring). To
be sure, that factor mitigated the effect of the racial standard, but did not change its nature.
Thus if senior blacks had been excluded from a training program solely because of their
race, such exclusion would not be validated because it occurred under a program that estab-
lished training opportunities previously unavailable to blacks as well as whites.
" Id. at 208. The Court, purporting to redeem pledges by Senator Humphrey and
others in the legislative debates, rejected the suggestion that the plan was designed perma-
nently to "maintain a racial balance." Id. at 207 n.7. Justice Rehnquist pointed, however, to
testimony by Kaiser personnel that undermined the conclusion that the plan was "tempo-
rary," id. at 223 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and persuasively suggested that the main-
tain/achieve distinction is analytically indefensible, id. at 240 n.19. In any event, the com-
pany estimated that even with the plan, black underrepresentation would continue for 30
years. Brief of Petitioner Kaiser at 52, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Cf. Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 604 P.2d 1365, 1385 n.4, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 495 n.4 (1980)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) ("This may give an impression of being a mere temporary expedient.
But the French, with a cynicism born of experience, have an appropriate saying: 'rien ne
dure comme le provisoire' (nothing lasts like the provisional).").
188 In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court
asserted that "it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition
of the population" at large. Id. at 340 n.20. The Court's assumption (apart from its pliable
qualification) is effectively challenged in Glazer, Issues on Availability, in PERSPECTIVES ON
AVAILABILITY, supra note 166, at 219. He argues that discrimination plays a small part in the
occupational distribution of ethnic groups in the United States. See generally E. HUTCHIN-
SON, IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN, 1850-1950, at 273-78 (1956). In any event, the diffi-
culties underlying the Court's assumption are suggested-impressionistically-by a recent
story that "80% of the nation's professional comedians [not further defined] are Jewish."
TI ME, Oct. 2, 1978, at 76, col. 1.
18I There was no suggestion below that a remedial quota was necessary to guard against
any commitment to covert discrimination on the part of Kaiser.
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whites or barring them altogether until a given statistical goal for
blacks is reached? Similarly, if an employer can lawfully establish
a quota for blacks higher than their ratio in the local labor force,
why should an employer who has achieved statistical parity in his
own plant be barred from continuing his preference as a means of
compensating for still unremedied "societal discrimination" else-
where? As these questions make clear, there is no principled basis
in the Court's opinion for upholding only those "voluntary" prefer-
ences that have the indicia of "moderation" stressed by the Court
in Weber.190
The Court's emphasis on Congress's preoccupation in 1964
with the plight of blacks invites the question whether voluntary
employment preferences may not favor Hispanics, white women, or
members of other "protected groups" who are not black. Neverthe-
less, the Court's emphasis on voluntarism and on "traditionally
segregated job categories," as well as Justice Blackmun's emphasis
on safety nets for employers, could be invoked to validate some
"voluntary" preferences designed to redress "underrepresentation"
of nonblack "protected" groups.191
If voluntary preferences for nonblack groups are brought
within Weber's rationale, a cluster of additional complexities will
arise from charges that blacks are being excessively favored at the
expense of Hispanics, women, or Vietnamese refugees-or from
charges that run the other way. May an employer lawfully prefer
blacks, male and female, to better qualified white females? 92 Such
a question would be complicated by adding members of other pro-
tected groups to women and blacks as candidates for preferences,
and by presenting hypothetical numbers that would provide a
190 The Court also noted that Kaiser's program did not involve any layoffs of white
employees. 443 U.S. at 208. No doubt that element made the plan more prudent and more
palatable to the company and union and to white employees uninterested in the training
program. But Title VII generally encompasses "discrimination" whether it involves layoffs
or promotions, and it is, accordingly, difficult to relate the absence of layoffs to the language
or purpose of the Act.
"I In Edmondson v. U.S. Steel Corp., [1979] 2 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (20 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas.) 1745 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 1979), the court upheld a preferential program for wo-
men, citing Weber, without any discussion of the limitations in the Court's opinion.
.2 An employer might adopt such a program for a variety of reasons: his conviction
that blacks, because of the special consequences of slavery, were specially entitled to com-
pensatory group preferences, or because of pressures by private civil rights groups and gov-
ernment agencies. On the other hand, male plaintiffs have challenged the legality of promo-
tion quotas worked out with the New York City Human Rights Commission allegedly
favoring less qualified women over male candidates. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1979, § B, at 1,
col. 7.
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plausible basis for charges by blacks or other groups that they were
being shortchanged. It is understandable that the Court in Weber
did not rush to confront either of these difficulties, or the related
difficulties of formulating and applying racial classifications. These
problems are, however, likely further to balkanize the work force
and to aggravate the uncertainties that already surround personnel
decisions. 193
The uncertainties mentioned above, although they may limit
the use of "voluntary" preferences, will in many instances protect
employers whose practices conform to EEOC guidelines, or affirm-
ative action programs adopted pursuant to the Executive Order
covering government contractors. Title VII provides protection
against damages liability on the part of firms that in good faith
have conformed to and relied on any written interpretation by the
EEOC.194  And under the EEOC's guidelines 95  issued shortly
before the Supreme Court's decision in Weber-and embodying
the position urged by the government in that case-an employer is
insulated against damages liability if he engages in reasonable af-
firmative action in order to redress statistical disparities or to carry
out an affirmative action plan pursuant to the Executive Order.
Given the looseness of the Court's justifications for upholding the
Kaiser program, reliance on almost any official guideline sanction-
ing such discrimination would appear to be reasonable and in good
faith.
193 Another source of uncertainty arises from a preemption question-whether Weber's
authorization of certain "voluntary" preferences preempts more restrictive state law. Title
VII by its terms appears to be nonpreemptive in this context, Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
708, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1976) (Title VII shall not eliminate liability imposed by any pre-
sent or future state law, except when such law would "require or permit ... any act which
would be ... unlawful" under Title VII), and seems to preserve state jurisdiction to strike
down preferential programs of the kind upheld in Weber, see also Lige v. Town of Mont-
clair, 72 N.J. 5, 17-18, 22, 367 A.2d 833, 839-40, 842 (1976). Under this view, the states
would be free to frustrate the congressional purpose, stressed by the Court in Weber, of
avoiding overregulation of employers and unions. The Court could avoid that anomalous
result only by disregarding what appears to be the clear antipreemption language in Title
VII.
1 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 713(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1976).
19 Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
Amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1979). The guidelines sought to confer immunity for "reverse
discrimination" more expansive than the immunity that could now be derived from the Su-
preme Court's decision in Weber, narrowly read. Whatever one's view of either the EEOC's
promulgation of the guidelines while Weber was sub judice or the EEOC's failure, following
the Weber decision, to qualify the guidelines in the light of that decision, an employer's
good-faith reliance on the guidelines would as of now appear to meet the good-faith require-
ment of section 713(b), see text and note at note 194 supra.
[47:423
The Weber Case
As a consequence, the Court's apparent effort in Weber to
limit the scope of permissible preferences may well be frustrated
by the Court's simultaneous failure to formulate an approach that
transcends the instant case. The uncertainties generated by Weber
may encourage the OFCC to step up pressure for "results"; those
pressures, coupled with the prospect of immunity against damages
for adopting preferential programs, may in turn propel employers
to multiply such programs for various groups. The irony, noticed
by Justice Rehnquist,"9 8 of labeling such formal or de facto quotas
"voluntary" will be more marked if Weber is followed by an in-
crease in the vigor or candor with which the procurement club is
wielded as a means of "quotification. 197
CONCLUSION
Weber has rebuffed a challenge to preferential hiring designed
to benefit black workers. But the foregoing questions reflect
Weber's accordion-like potential: it may be severely limited or
broadened, without doing violence to its plastic language. For the
present, the Court's work in Weber has the value of underscoring
the profound immorality of the older racism. But the Court legiti-
mated a new form of racism that places disproportionately heavy
burdens on the Brian Webers of the world and that repudiates an
ideal of equal opportunity that has deserved and commanded
broad support. In reworking both the moralities and the language
of Title VII, the Court did not address the deeper issues of values
and legal process that met in the Weber case. The net result is an
opinion that, with respect, is a profound disappointment, whether
tested by its depth, its clarity, its candor, or its power to
convince.198
1 443 U.S. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
197 The elasticity of the "voluntariness" concept is shown by the holding that compli-
ance with the recent wage and price guidelines, even though they are theoretically enforcea-
ble by debarment, is "voluntary" because there is no "right" to hold a government contract.
See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, [1979] 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (24 Wage and Hour Cas.) 162 (D.C.
Cir. June 22, 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). Judge MacKinnon dis-
sented, arguing in part that Congress did not intend to grant the President such power. Id.
at 171. Judge Robb also dissented, stating in part that "[n]o amount of sophisticated or
metaphysical argument can convince me that compliance under threat of such massive eco-
nomic sanctions is voluntary." Id. at 186 (footnote omitted).
19 After remand, Judge Gee, who had previously spoken for the court of appeals in
Weber, filed an extraordinary statement expressing his "personal conviction that the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court ... is profoundly wrong." Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 611 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 1980). Judge Wisdom, although describing that decision as
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"profoundly right," relied not on the Court's opinion but on his own prior dissent, which
only Justice Blackmun had embraced. Id. (Wisdom, J., specially concurring).
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